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Rhode Island’s School Funding 
Challenges in Historical Context 
Daniel W. Morton-Bentley* 
INTRODUCTION 
A new federal lawsuit, A.C. v. Raimondo, alleges that Rhode 
Islanders have a constitutional right to a basic level of education.1  
While the specific claim in that lawsuit is novel, its approach is not.  
Beginning in the 1970s, education advocates filed numerous federal 
lawsuits alleging that state funding mechanisms for local school 
districts violated students’ constitutional rights to education and 
equal protection.2  When the United States Supreme Court rejected 
these arguments in the 1973 case of San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, advocates presented their arguments 
to state courts, alleging similar violations based on state 
constitutional provisions.3  Rhode Island’s funding system was 
challenged in the 1995 case of City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun.4  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court decisively rejected the challenge, as 
well as a successor case filed almost two decades later.5  State 
 
 *  Assistant Counsel, New York State Education Department; LL.M, 
Suffolk University Law School; J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law.  
Thank you to the library staff at the New York State Library for their research 
assistance.  Thanks also to Stephen Lapatin and the editorial staff of the Roger 
Williams University Law Review for their careful review and to Kaitlin 
Morton-Bentley for her insightful suggestions.  The views expressed in this 
Article are the author's own. 
 1. Complaint 2, ¶ 1, A.C. v. Raimondo, No. 1:18-cv-00645 (D. R.I. Nov. 28, 
2018), https://www.tc.columbia.edu/media/news/images/2018/november/
CookvRaimondoFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD8T-DLF3]. 
 2. Id. at 15. 
 3. See 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973). 
 4. 662 A.2d 40, 42 (R.I. 1995). 
 5. Id. at 62–63; Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 792 (R.I. 
2014). 
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courts have reached different conclusions as to whether their state 
constitutions impose funding or adequacy obligations. 
Does the Rhode Island Constitution require equality or some 
measure of adequacy in state funding to local school districts?  This 
question actually presents two questions: does the Rhode Island 
Constitution impose such a requirement, and, regardless, should 
the Constitution impose such a requirement?  In this Article, I 
contend that neither of these questions can be answered without 
examining Rhode Island’s school funding challenges in historical 
context.  This Article examines two historical periods that are 
crucial to understand whether Rhode Island’s Constitution confers 
a right to educational funding.  The first is the 1840s, a tumultuous 
decade that produced the Rhode Island Constitution.6  The second 
period is the 1960s and 1970s, the period when advocates, inspired 
by the educational jurisprudence that grew out of Brown v. Board 
of Education, invented and sold the constitutional argument for 
school funding.7 
I further contend that the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
reached the correct—or at least the only historically defensible—
conclusion in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun.  There is no evidence 
that Rhode Island sought to enshrine an equality or adequacy 
principle in its Constitution.  This argument was the creation of 
imaginative, well-intentioned academics in the 1960s and 1970s.  
While greater funding for impoverished school districts is a noble 
goal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court wisely declined to reach such 
a policy into the Rhode Island Constitution based in part on a lack 
of historical evidence. 
As evidenced by A.C. v. Raimondo, endless permutations of the 
constitutional argument for educational adequacy persist.  I 
contend that these arguments should be subjected to the same 
historical scrutiny as the funding challenge in City of Pawtucket v. 
Sundlun.  A close examination of the history of a constitutional 
provision ensures the existence of an independent judiciary.  To 
ignore history invites judicial activism, which is a double-edged 
sword: it may favor liberal causes one day and conservative ones 
the next.8 
 
 6. See discussion infra section III.   
 7. See 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 8. MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 4 (2009) (“The new model of public law litigation 
has become such an established part of the legal landscape that conservatives 
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A brief word is necessary regarding the method of 
constitutional interpretation employed in this Article.  There exists 
a vigorous debate as to how to best interpret statutory or 
constitutional provisions.  Two “isms” dominate the literature from 
the 1980s to the present: textualism and originalism.  These 
theories, appealing in their simplicity, have become saddled with 
qualifications.  A recent book by the late Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Bryan A. Garner promoting textualism identified fifty-seven canons 
of statutory interpretation (and thirteen “false rules”),9 while 
originalism, according to one commentator, begat the theory of 
“original intentions originalism,” which begat “new” originalism.10  
The academy is engaged in a perpetual quest for a theory that will 
unlock all constitutional conundrums, past and present. 
I decline to fashion any such theory.  While there is wisdom in 
textualism (words should be the focus of the inquiry), originalism 
(the intention and history of a provision matter), and the living 
constitution (constitutional meanings can evolve over time), I 
proceed on the assumption that the paramount consideration is the 
text of a constitutional provision and the historical circumstances 
that motivated its enactment.  In addition, I explicitly reject the 
fundamentalist assumption that there is one “true” interpretation 
of such provisions.  If lawyers wish to dabble in history, they must 
understand that the discipline is one of constant argument and 
critique, not preordained certainty.11 
 
as well as liberals now routinely look to the courts to remedy legislative or 
executive actions of which they disapprove.”). 
 9. ANTONIN SCALIA AND BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012). 
 10. M. Alexander Pearl, Originalism and Indians, 93 TULANE L. REV. 269, 
275–76 (2018). 
 11. See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, THE QUARTET: ORCHESTRATING THE SECOND 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1783-1789 212, n.37 (2015).  I also reject the two-fold 
approach suggested by Alexander Bickel in his article, “The Original 
Understanding and the Segregation Decision.”  Bickel suggested that one 
should first examine “the congressional understanding of the immediate effect 
of the enactment on conditions then present,” and second, examine “what if 
any thought was given to the long-range effect, under future circumstances, of 
provisions necessarily intended for permanence.”  Alexander M. Bickel, The 
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 
(1955).  Bickel was one of Justice Felix Frankfurter’s law clerks when the Court 
issued the merits and remedy decisions in Brown v. Board of Education.  His 
theory, then, is better understood as a defense of Brown rather than an 
interpretive method with broad applicability.  See also Michael J. Klarman, 
Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor 
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Part II of this Article offers a general history of public 
education in Rhode Island.  Part III discusses Henry Barnard and 
Thomas Wilson Dorr, whose actions in the 1840s made an indelible 
mark on public education in Rhode Island.  Part IV examines the 
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Brown v. Board of 
Education, the case that spawned immeasurable litigation 
concerning public education.12  Part V is devoted to a discussion of 
post-war legal activism, the Warren Court, and public education.  
Part VI addresses school funding litigation, first at the federal level 
and, after 1973, at the state level.  Part VII analyzes the two Rhode 
Island school funding challenges, and Part VIII offers a brief 
conclusion. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN RHODE ISLAND 
Massachusetts was the pioneer in colonial education.  The 
Massachusetts Bay Colony was settled by Puritans, a Calvinist sect 
that fled religious persecution in England.13  Generally, colonial 
towns in New England during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, including the Massachusetts Bay Colony, funded local 
schools by a tax levied on residents.14  These schools were run by a 
teacher or schoolmaster selected by the town.  As Protestants, the 
Puritans believed in the authority of the written Bible above all 
else.15  Education, then, was useful insofar as it would facilitate 
reading the Bible.16 
Two colonial Massachusetts laws anticipated future trends in 
education.  First, a 1642 law required compulsory school 
attendance, punishable by fine.17  This reflected a social 
 
McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995). 
 12. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 13. GA. DEP’T OF EDUC., TEACHER NOTES: UNITED STATES HISTORY FOR THE 
GEORGIA STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE IN SOCIAL STUDIES 44 (May 31, 2017), 
https://www.georgiastandards.org/Georgia-Standards/Documents/Social-
Studies-United-States-History-Teacher-Notes.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5BC-
GVA4]. 
 14. Id. at 8. 
 15. See April 14, 1642: Massachusetts Passes First Education Law, 
MASSMOMENTS.ORG, https://www.massmoments.org/moment-details/
massachusetts-passes-first-education-law.html [https://perma.cc/N3BY-
9LH4] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Massachusetts Passes First 
Education Law]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
276 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 24:272 
commitment to school attendance.18  Second, a 1647 Massachusetts 
law required towns with fifty or more inhabitants to appoint 
schoolmasters, and towns with one hundred or more inhabitants to 
create grammar schools.19  The latter law became known as the 
“Old Deluder Satan Act” after its memorable preface, which 
indicated that it was a “chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to 
keep men from the knowledge of the Scriptures . . . .”20  In New 
England, schools remained religiously grounded into the early 
nineteenth century.21 
Rhode Island did not follow the Massachusetts model of 
education.  After banishment from the Massachusetts Bay Colony 
for his anti-authoritarian views of religion (particularly his 
conception of “soul liberty”), theologian Roger Williams welcomed 
fellow religious outcasts to Rhode Island, including Baptists, 
Quakers, and Jews.22  For Williams and others, public education 
smacked of religion—specifically, Puritanical religion.23  This 
contributed to antipathy toward a mass system of public education, 
which could, religious minorities feared, become a tool to silence 
religious dissent.  It also reflected the “rampant individualism” of 
the colony.  Scholar Edith Nye MacMullen posits that “[f]ear of 
centralization and a concentration of power were almost 
pathological” among Rhode Islanders.24 
 
 18. Id.  Whether this actually achieved compliance is beside the point.  As 
scholar David B. Tyack put it, “generally these laws were unenforced and 
probably unenforceable.”  David B. Tyack, Ways of Seeing: An Essay on the 
History of Compulsory Schooling, 46 HARV. EDUC. REV. 355, 359 (1976). 
 19. Massachusetts Passes First Education Law, supra note 15. 
 20. Old Deluder Satan Law of 1647, MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/files/
documents/2016/08/ob/deludersatan.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5ML-Z3R9] (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2019). 
 21. One aspect of this legacy was that Thomas Wilson Dorr’s People’s 
Constitution, discussed herein, explicitly referenced the “fear of God” as a 
rationale for a system of public education.  CHARLES A. CARROLL, PUBLIC 
EDUCATION IN RHODE ISLAND 13 (1918).  
 22. October 9, 1635: Roger Williams Banished, MASSMOMENTS.ORG, 
https://www.massmoments.org/moment-details/roger-williams-banished.html 
[https://perma.cc/3JMR-FLYK] (last visited Jan. 27, 2019) [hereinafter Roger 
Williams Banished]. 
 23. See Massachusetts Passes First Education Law, supra note 15. 
 24. EDITH NYE MACMULLEN, IN THE CAUSE OF TRUE EDUCATION: HENRY 
BARNARD AND THE 19TH CENTURY SCHOOL REFORM 106 (1991).  Charles A. Caroll, 
whose 1918 book “Public Education in Rhode Island” was relied upon by the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court relied in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, contests 
this assertion and resents any implication of “alleged backwardness in 
education.” CARROLL, supra note 21, at 13. 
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Despite these fears, in the wake of the industrial revolution, 
middle-class Rhode Islanders eventually warmed to the idea of 
public education.  Ample access to waterpower made northern 
Rhode Island uniquely situated to become the center of the state’s 
industrial revolution.25  The technology for the water-powered 
textile mill had been pioneered in England by Jedediah Strutt.26  
Samuel Slater, one of eight children in an English farming family, 
apprenticed with Strutt in the late eighteenth century.27  Slater 
realized the potential of the textile mill and memorized as much of 
the design as he could.28  After Slater’s apprenticeship expired in 
1789, he immigrated to New York to replicate the experiments in 
America.29  While in New York, he learned that Moses Brown, a 
Rhode Island businessman, sought to introduce cotton spinning and 
textile production to Rhode Island.30  Brown and Slater agreed to a 
deal, and, after futile efforts to impose Arkwright-style spinning 
frames on existing machinery, Slater recreated Strutt’s designs 
from England.31  Slater was immensely successful; the first mill 
was built on the banks of the Blackstone River in Pawtucket, Rhode 
Island, in 1793.32  But recreating Strutt’s designs was illegal; for 
his misdeeds, Slater was dubbed, “Slater the traitor” across the 
Pond.33  President Andrew Jackson, by contrast, called Slater “The 
Father of the American Industrial Revolution.”34  Mills proliferated 
in the Blackstone River Valley, in close proximity to Providence.35  
As industrial technology advanced, proximity to water was no 
longer necessary and Providence transformed into a manufacturing 
center.36 
 
 25. NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at 106.  
 26. Strutt had based his design, in turn, on architecture by the British 
inventor Richard Arkwright.  JOHN WILLIAMS HALEY, THE LOWER BLACKSTONE 
RIVER VALLEY 50 (1936). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 50–51. 
 31. Id. at 51. 
 32. Id. at 52.  
 33. Samuel Slater - The Father of the American Industrial Revolution, 
DAILY KOS (Mar. 29, 2013, 10:29 PM), https://www.dailykos.com/stories/
2013/3/29/1197996/-Samuel-Slater [https://perma.cc/VCS9-95W4]. 
 34. Id. 
 35. ERIK J. CHAPUT, THE PEOPLE’S MARTYR: THOMAS WILSON DORR AND HIS 
1842 RHODE ISLAND REBELLION 15 (2013). 
 36. Id. 
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The textile mills ushered in the rise of the modern industrial 
state, with all its benefits and burdens.  The impact of industrialism 
on Rhode Island cannot be overstated.  It shifted the state’s historic 
center of power from the sea to the land, which shifted political and 
economic power from Newport to Providence.37  It also led to an 
influx of immigrants, who arrived to meet factory owners’ demand 
for cheap labor.38  These immigrants recalibrated the social 
dynamic of Providence: “The influx of thousands of strangers into 
what had been a relatively homogeneous community disrupted 
traditional face-to-face relationships and eroded consensual 
values.”39 
Industrialism also caused political inequality, which was 
particularly pronounced in Rhode Island.40  The state, still 
operating under its colonial charter issued in 1620, afforded equal 
representation to each village or city in the general assembly, 
regardless of population.  As Americans and immigrants became 
increasingly packed into urban and manufacturing centers, this 
produced absurd results.  For example, in 1841, Providence housed 
forty percent of the white male population (which paid two-thirds 
of Rhode Island’s taxes), but only provided five percent of the state’s 
lawmakers.41 
The industrial revolution coincided with the social movement 
known as the Second Great Awakening, a national movement of 
religious revival characterized by appeals to emotion and 
revelation.42  The Second Great Awakening also had a social 
component; many reformers sought to purify their souls by 
purifying society.43  This led reformers to advocate for temperance 
and other forms of social and individual improvement.44  The “goal 
was . . . to elevate the moderate, self-reliant, industrious, and moral 
 
 37. See id. at 15–16; see also JOHN S. GILKESON, JR., MIDDLE-CLASS 
PROVIDENCE, 1820–1940 7 (1986). 
 38. See generally GILKESON, supra note 37, at 7. 
 39. Id. at 19. 
 40. NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at 106. 
 41. Id. at 106–07. 
 42. See Religious Transformation and the Second Great Awakening, 
USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/us/22c.asp [https://perma.cc/UNJ3-
WWNS] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Institutionalizing Religious Belief: The Benevolent Empire, 
USHISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/us/22d.asp [https://perma.cc/
M7M4-JWG8] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019). 
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citizen.”45  This reinforced the Victorian belief that society was 
engaged in a perpetual march toward progress.46 
This reforming impulse manifested in a mission to improve 
public schools.47  Nye MacMullen explains that, in the early 1800s, 
a “new vision and a new urgency” to improve public education 
appeared.  This vision had two elements.48  First, education was to 
be approached methodologically.49  Methods for instructing pupils 
and teachers alike would be ascertained, taught, and replicated.50  
Second, states were called upon to do more to assist local school 
districts.51  Not unlike later social reform movements like the New 
Deal and the Great Society, education reform was a top-down affair.  
Reformers sought to utilize the power of towns, villages, and 
cities—and to some extent, the state—to improve the quality of 
local education.52  The most prominent feature of the reform 
movement was the concept of the “common school”—so named 
because it was common to all inhabitants of a locality.53  In the 
common school movement, the Victorian and Protestant values of 
“religious faith, economic industry, civic virtue, and education 
[were] all closely linked . . . .”54 
III. THE REFORMERS: HENRY BARNARD AND THOMAS WILSON DORR 
The two towering figures in the common school movement were 
Horace Mann and Henry Barnard.  While Barnard has slid into 
relative obscurity, in their day, both Mann and Barnard were giants 
who sought to bring structure and rigor to the teaching 
 
 45. NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at 50. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See id. at 53; see also CARL L. BANKSTON III & STEPHEN J. CALDAS, 
PUBLIC EDUCATION—AMERICA’S CIVIL RELIGION: A SOCIAL HISTORY 29, 31 
(2009). 
 48. NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at 54. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 53. 
 52. Id.  Historian John S. Gilkeson, Jr. argues that an incipient middle 
class formed around the time of the common school movement, and that the 
public education movement was one way in which the “stable, industrious, 
sober middle classes of society” set themselves apart from the excesses of the 
rich and the uncultured poor.  GILKESON, supra note 37, at 10. 
 53.  Public School, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 54.  BANKSTON & CALDAS, supra note 47, at 24.  The quote describes the 
philosophy of lexicographer Noah Webster but could be equally said concerning 
the common school movement.   
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profession.55  Barnard is important to the history of Rhode Island, 
as the State brought him in as an outside expert to make 
recommendations regarding Rhode Island’s educational system. 
Barnard was raised in a prosperous Hartford, Connecticut, 
household, and later attended Yale University.56  He meandered 
for a few years after graduation, and eventually set his sights on 
politics.  Barnard was elected to the Connecticut Legislature in 
1837.57  Although the school improvement movement preceded his 
election, Barnard “adopted the school cause” as his own.58  Barnard 
threw himself into the issue, investigating Connecticut’s public 
schools and designing a comprehensive system of school reform.59  
His investigation culminated in a report, which New York 
Chancellor James Kent described as a “‘bold and startling 
document.’”60  It was a meticulously detailed description of the 
system that highlighted its weaknesses and identified areas of 
potential improvement.61  The Connecticut Legislature enacted 
many of Barnard’s proposed reforms, and several years later, 
“[a]ttendance at school meetings was higher, there were new and 
repaired schools throughout the state, and in many of them uniform 
sets of books had been made available . . . .”62  By 1841, Connecticut 
Democrats fought back against public school reform, an issue which 
they deemed “a party question, inaugurated by the Whigs, for the 
benefit of the Whigs.”63  In 1842, when Democrats achieved a 
majority in both houses, they repealed most of Barnard’s reform 
legislation.64 
Nevertheless, Barnard’s reputation as an educational reformer 
of the highest order was solidified.  In 1843, Rhode Island Governor 
James Fenner engaged Barnard to repeat the Connecticut magic; 
his specific orders were “to survey the state, to visit schools and 
collect information in order to make recommendations for the 
‘improvement and better management of same.’”65 
 
 55. NYE MACMULLEN, supra note 24, at ix. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 45. 
 58. Id. at 58–59. 
 59. Id. at 62–63. 
 60. Id. at 75. 
 61. Id. at 77. 
 62. Id. at 99. 
 63. Id. at 96. 
 64. Id. at 97. 
 65. Id. at 111. 
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Barnard stepped into a state recovering from a political crisis.  
The crisis was precipitated by a rebellion led by Thomas Wilson 
Dorr, an attorney and social activist.66  Dorr descended from two 
generations of traders.67  After making a fortune in Massachusetts, 
Dorr’s father settled in Providence.68  Dorr enjoyed a privileged 
upbringing, attending Phillips Exeter Academy and Harvard.69  
Upon graduation from Harvard, he studied law with New York 
Chancellor James Kent, the aforementioned admirer of Barnard’s 
Connecticut report and “the most prominent state-level jurist in the 
country.”70  Dorr returned to Providence in the mid-1820s to 
practice law after a clerkship with famed Rhode Island attorney 
John Whipple.71  After a tour of the South and a sojourn in New 
York City, Dorr returned to Providence in 1831.72  He enjoyed a few 
years of success as a practicing lawyer and then threw himself into 
politics.73  Dorr was elected to Rhode Island’s General Assembly in 
1834 as a Whig.74 Dorr later switched party affiliation and became 
the Democratic Party chair in 1840.75 
Dorr was an ardent reformer and an abolitionist.  He favored 
greater banking regulation and, as relevant to this Article, public 
education reform.  Indeed, one of Dorr’s earliest causes was for the 
creation of a high school in Providence.76  However, the issue that 
became his rallying cry was universal white male suffrage.  As 
mentioned above, Rhode Island continued to operate under its 
colonial charter in the nineteenth century.77  The charter set 
restrictive voting conditions: only landowners with land worth more 
than $134 (in contemporary dollars) could vote.78  Professor 
Lawrence Friedman estimates that this “excluded perhaps nine out 
of ten even of white males over twenty-one.”79  Dorr railed against 
this requirement, which he felt to be a mockery of democratic 
 
 66. CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 29. 
 67. Id. at 14. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 16–17. 
 70. Id. at 21. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 23, 28. 
 73. See id. at 25. 
 74. Id. at 32. 
 75. Id. at 47.  
 76. Id. at 32. 
 77. See id. at 30. 
 78. Id.  
 79. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 75 (3d ed. 2005). 
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representation. 
Dorr eventually joined the Rhode Island Suffrage Association, 
a “conglomeration of urban Whigs, reform-minded Democrats, and 
radical labor leaders.”80  The Suffrage Association developed a 
statement of rights called the People’s Constitution, which 
contained many of the reforms close to Dorr’s heart, including a 
greater role for the State in education.  The education clause read 
as follows: 
The diffusion of knowledge, and the cultivation of a sound 
morality in the fear of God being of the first importance in 
a republican State, and indispensable to the maintenance 
of its liberty, it shall be an imperative duty of the 
Legislature to promote the establishment of free schools 
and to assist in the support of public education.81 
The People’s Constitution also directed revenue from “lotteries 
and auction duties, as well as the entire income of the United States 
deposit fund” to be placed in a permanent education fund, thus 
providing a continual and ample source of state funding for 
education.82 
One reform cause notably absent from the People’s 
Constitution was abolition.  While personally opposed to slavery, 
Dorr excluded abolition from the coverage of the People’s 
Constitution as part of a political bargain.83  For this, he was 
pilloried by anti-slavery activists.84 
The General Assembly, responding to the People’s 
Constitution, called a constitutional convention in 1841 and 
developed its own constitution, the so-called Landholders’ 
Constitution.85  The Landholders’ Constitution included, like the 
People’s Constitution, a provision concerning education.  However, 
it was much more general than its counterpart.  It read as follows: 
The diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue, among the 
 
 80. CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 51.  The Rhode Island Suffrage Association 
was founded on March 27, 1840.  Id.  
 81. City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 46–47 (R.I. 1995) (emphasis 
omitted); see also CARROLL, supra note 21, at 121. 
 82. CARROLL, supra note 21, at 123.  The People’s Constitution further 
forbade borrowing from the aforementioned fund.  Ironically, funds were 
borrowed to suppress Dorr’s Rebellion.  Id. 
 83. CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 59, 69.   
 84. Id. at 69–70, 75. 
 85. Id. at 64–65. 
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people being essential to the preservation of their rights 
and liberties, it shall be the duty of the General Assembly 
to promote public schools and to adopt all other means to 
secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of 
education which they may deem necessary and proper.86 
Dorr participated in the Landholders’ Convention, but soon soured 
on it when the convention decided to retain, among other 
provisions, the property requirements for voters.87 
The Suffrage Association, through the newly-formed People’s 
Party, submitted the People’s Constitution to the people for a vote.  
The vote passed overwhelmingly: 13,944 in favor and fifty-two 
opposed.88  Unsurprisingly, newly “enfranchised” voters (i.e., those 
who were not, in fact, eligible to vote but would receive the franchise 
if the vote passed), cast ballots in favor of the measure.  However, 
even excluding these voters, the ballot measure still would have 
passed: the majority of legal freeholders voted in favor of the 
People’s Constitution.89  On April 18, 1842, elections were held 
under the People’s Constitution and Dorr was elected Governor.90  
Rhode Island now boasted two governments, and a constitutional 
crisis was born. 
The Landholders’ Constitution was also put to a vote, but it 
failed to pass by a narrow margin of 8,689 to 8,013.91  While Dorr 
celebrated, the general assembly set in motion a plan to crack down 
on the Suffrage Association.  In early April 1842, it passed a series 
of resolutions, one of which deemed it treason to assume office 
under the People’s Constitution.92  On May 9, 1842, a warrant was 
issued for Dorr’s arrest.93 
The stage was thus set for a dramatic confrontation between 
the existing government and the People’s government.  Instead, two 
events in May 1842 caused the precipitous downfall of Dorr and the 
People’s Party.  First, despite a personal appeal from Dorr, 
 
 86.  City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 47 (R.I. 1995). 
 87. CHAPUT, supra note 35, at 66. 
 88. Id. at 76–77. 
 89. Id. at 77. 
 90. Patrick T. Conley, Popular Sovereignty or Public Anarchy?  America 
Debates the Dorr Rebellion, in RHODE ISLAND IN RHETORIC AND REFLECTION: 
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President John Tyler refused to provide assistance to the People’s 
Party.94  Tyler feared that federal intervention would have 
explosive implications in the American South: if the federal 
government were willing to intervene on behalf of disenfranchised 
white voters, what would stop a later Yankee administration from 
intervening on behalf of African-Americans?95  Although Tyler 
stood to lose support from Northern Democrats who supported 
Dorr, the risk of igniting the slavery question was too grave.  Tyler 
wrote to Rhode Island Governor Samuel Ward King and informed 
him that he would not intervene in Rhode Island’s internecine 
squabble if and until it reached the point of armed rebellion.96 
Second, on May 17, 1842, Dorr launched a disastrous attempt 
to seize an arsenal in Providence.97  After President Tyler denied 
Dorr’s request for federal assistance, Dorr visited New York City.98  
There, Dorr received a friendly reception and the promise of 
support.99  When Dorr returned to Rhode Island, he learned that 
Governor King had upped the political stakes: King had declared 
martial law and imprisoned a number of Dorr’s supporters.100  
Additionally, a one thousand dollar bounty had been placed on 
Dorr’s head.101 
Dorr faced this adversity with revolutionary fervor.  Upon his 
return to Providence in May 1842, he delivered a speech in which 
he professed, “‘his readiness to die in the cause in which he had 
sacrificed everything but his life.’”  Raising a sword skyward, Dorr 
declared that his “‘ensanguined blade should be again imbued with 
blood, should the people’s cause require it.’”102 
Dorr decided that it was time to take action and seize the 
arsenal located in Providence.  Dorr secured two cannons in a 
building controlled by local militias and arranged for them to be 
wheeled to his headquarters on Federal Hill.103  In the evening, 
 
 94. See id. at 132. 
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 101. Id. at 144. 
 102. Howard R. Ernst, A Call to Arms: Thomas Wilson Dorr’s Forceful Effort 
to Implement the People’s Constitution, in 66 RHODE ISLAND HISTORY 59, 62 
(2008). 
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Dorr and hundreds of his supporters (though less than anticipated), 
proceeded to the arsenal to launch an attack.104  The cannons, 
which were the centerpiece of the planned assault, did not fire.105  
Dorr affected a hasty retreat.  This, in turn, caused his outside 
support, including in New York, to evaporate.  The “Dorr Rebellion” 
thereafter collapsed and the general assembly regained control of 
the State.106  Dorr was eventually captured, tried for treason, found 
guilty, and received a life sentence of hard labor.107  His sentence 
was later commuted, but Dorr lived out the rest of his days in 
relative obscurity.108 
After the failure of the Landholders’ Convention, the general 
assembly drew up a new constitution, which voters approved in 
November of 1842.109  The Constitution boasted some significant 
reforms; for example, it offered suffrage to African-Americans and 
outlawed slavery.110  But despite these concessions to 
egalitarianism, the document generally affirmed the interests of 
Rhode Island’s elites.111  For example, while it lessened voting 
restrictions, it retained the $134 property qualification for “foreign-
born naturalized citizens,” which, according to Dorr’s biographer, 
Erik J. Chaput, was intended to disenfranchise Irish Catholics who 
were immigrating in large numbers.112  And its education provision 
was remarkably similar to the version set forth in the Landholders’ 
Convention.113  Thus, the conservative forces had won.  Governor 
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King’s successor in 1843 was James Fenner, who previously served 
as Governor from 1807 to 1811, and again from 1824 to 1831.114  
Governor Fenner’s party, which had been assembled by Governor 
King in response to the Dorr Rebellion, called itself the Law and 
Order or “legal” party of Rhode Island.115  Thus, in a not-too-subtle 
metaphor, law and order had been restored to Rhode Island. 
In the wake of the tumultuous and divisive events of the Dorr 
Rebellion, Rhode Island politicians agreed on a noncontroversial 
cause: incremental improvement of the public schools.  Barnard 
was an attractive candidate for the task, as his Great Awakening-
influenced vision of public school improvement was agreeable to 
both moderate Whigs and moderate Democrats.116  Barnard 
brought the same tireless, methodical approach that he employed 
in Connecticut to Rhode Island.117 
Barnard produced an educational proposal containing various 
provisions concerning support of the public schools.118  The plan 
established a firm administrative structure for the public schools 
and “mandated a shared responsibility for the support of schools” 
between local districts and the State.119  With respect to funding, 
while the plan confirmed that twenty-five thousand dollars of state 
money would be devoted to the “‘encouragement and maintenance 
of public schools,’” it did not require local districts to establish 
schools or set a financial floor.120  The general assembly adopted 
Barnard’s plan and appointed him the first Commissioner of 
Education for the State of Rhode Island.121 
Barnard’s education plan promoted organization and quality in 
the public education system, but did not require the State to 
allocate significant funds to education.122  Thus, there is no 
evidence that the drafters of the Rhode Island Constitution, 
particularly in light the tumultuous events of the 1840s, sought to 
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equalize educational resources throughout the state vis-à-vis the 
Rhode Island Constitution. 
IV. BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
The argument that state and federal constitutions require 
equal or adequate funding originated in the post-World War II era, 
an era conveniently bookended by two landmark United States 
Supreme Court cases concerning public education: Brown v. Board 
of Education (Brown I), in 1954,123 and San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, in 1973.124  Law had previously been 
utilized as a political and social tool, but its use in these respects 
grew exponentially in the post-war era.  In the hands of activists, 
law became a blunt instrument to compel the government to 
effectuate social change.  The intellectual roots of this development 
can be traced to Brown.125 
While in retrospect, Brown seems a fait accompli, it was a 
groundbreaking and radical decision that departed from traditional 
notions of judicial review.126  Noah Feldman put the stakes thusly: 
“A Supreme Court ruling that segregation was unconstitutional 
would be the most aggressive piece of judicial activism in American 
history.”127  After oral arguments in Brown I, the Justices were 
immediately divided, and those who sought to strike down 
segregation disagreed on how to do so.128  Justice Robert H. 
Jackson, reluctant to strike down segregation, insisted that if the 
Court prohibited segregation, it should admit that it was making 
new law and not adhering to the original meaning of the equal 
protection clause.  After heroic efforts of persuasion led by Justice 
Felix Frankfurter, the Court reached a consensus: it would hold 
that segregation was unconstitutional without Justice Jackson’s 
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candid admission.129  When Justice Warren read the opinion aloud 
and reached the key holding, he improvised the word 
“unanimously,” so as to read: “we unanimously hold.”130  At the 
word “unanimously,” audible gasps went through the courtroom.131 
It was a bold, courageous stand against segregation.  But 
rendering the decision was the easy part.  Brown I addressed 
liability (i.e., whether segregated schools violated the equal 
protection clause), while a successor decision, known as Brown II, 
addressed the remedy (i.e., how segregation would be 
eliminated).132  The Court understood that a demand for immediate 
compliance might lead Southern states to simply abolish public 
education.133 
Brown II was issued on May 31, 1955, one year after  
Brown I sent shockwaves through the political and judicial 
system.134  It returned the underlying cases to the lower courts and 
informed them that principles of equity should guide the remedy: 
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will 
be guided by equitable principles . . . characterized by a 
practical flexibility . . . Courts of equity may properly take 
into account the public interest in the elimination of such 
obstacles . . . .135 
In other words, courts were commanded to do what they had to do 
to implement Brown I.136  With respect to timing, however, the 
Court gave school districts and states substantial leeway.137  The 
Court recognized the myriad difficulties in restructuring local 
school systems and acknowledged that change could not occur 
overnight.138  Thus, the Court ordered compliance to proceed with 
“all deliberate speed.”139 
Despite the Justices’ “heroic” compromise and ruling, Brown I 
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proved “incoherent as a statement of constitutional law.”140  Noah 
Feldman explained: 
The mess that the Court and the country made of Brown 
[I] in the years that followed reflected this incoherence.  
Was Brown a strong statement that the Constitution 
demanded desegregation?  Then why did its sequel, Brown 
II, contemplate a gradual and stepwise remedy, one that 
was not even specified in detail?  Was Brown [I] based on 
the original meaning of the Constitution or on changed 
circumstances that required the Constitution itself to 
change?141 
The Court’s “intentional” decision to gloss over these issues, 
Feldman argues, “cast the whole problem of constitutional 
interpretation into decades of turmoil.”142 
Conceptual problems aside, implementation of Brown II was a 
herculean labor.  In response to the Brown decisions, “[g]ood faith 
did not follow” in the deep South.143  Some localities actively 
resisted, while others dragged their heels.  Racial violence surged 
in 1955; this violence included the infamous and “particularly 
gruesome” murder of Emmett Till.144  In March of the following 
year, nineteen United States Senators and eighty-two United 
States Representatives signed the so-called “Southern Manifesto,” 
a document that denounced Brown II as an “abus[e] [of] judicial 
power” and “urged southerners” to resist forced integration by “all 
‘lawful means.’”145  In 1959, Prince Edward County, Virginia closed 
all of its public schools.  African-Americans challenged the closure 
in court, but students lost years of schooling while this litigation 
played out.146  Some whites, desperate to find a fig leaf for 
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segregation, even dredged up the antiquated doctrine of 
interposition.147  School districts were repeatedly dragged into 
court, and several of the disputes reached the United States 
Supreme Court.148 
The Court affirmed its holdings in Brown I and Brown II and 
grew increasingly tired of efforts to evade its desegregation orders.  
In the 1968 case of Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County, the Court struck down a school board’s “freedom of choice” 
plan enacted 10 years after Brown II.149  The Court chided the 
school board for the delay, calling it out its “deliberate perpetuation 
of [an] unconstitutional dual system” and declaring that “[s]uch 
delays are no longer tolerable.”150  Additionally, in the 1971 case of 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the Court 
opined that the States were moving too slow, integration was 
inevitable, and, though it would be painful and awkward, the 
transitional period of integration would be brief.151  The Court also 
explicitly endorsed a polarizing remedy: busing.  Thus, the Court 
gave its blessing to judicial rerouting of local busing assignments to 
promote racial diversity.152 
The majority of white Americans disapproved of busing,153 and 
the public response to such efforts was “swift and largely 
hostile.”154  As commentators Thomas and Mary Edsall memorably 
put it, busing “fell like an ax through the Democratic Party, 
severing long-standing connections and creating a new set of 
troubled alliances: white, blue-collar northerners with southerners 
against blacks and upper-middle-class liberals.”155  Richard Nixon, 
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in particular, made much political hay out of public opposition to 
busing in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  This was a deliberate 
strategy to cultivate the white southern vote and secure his 
reelection in 1972.156 
While the Court had suggested in Green and Swann that its 
commitment to integration was unbending, its enthusiasm waned 
in the 1970s.  Just three years after the Court’s enthusiastic 
commitment to desegregation in Swann, it held, in Milliken v. 
Bradley,157 that Detroit could not combat white flight by merging 
suburban, largely white school districts with overwhelmingly 
African-American Detroit.158  The Court reasoned that the 
suburban districts had not engaged in segregation and, thus, could 
not be forced to take any remedial action.  Milliken, Professor 
James T. Patterson argues, “badly hurt whatever hopes reformers 
still maintained of overturning de facto segregation of the schools . 
. . .”159 
V. THE LEGAL HOOK, THE WARREN COURT, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 
For all the trouble surrounding its implementation, Brown I 
was a massive victory for social activists.  Brown I proved that 
lawyers could dream up a theory and enact it into law.  Better yet, 
lawyers could share in the moral credit for their achievements.160  
This proved irresistible for lawyers in the post-war era, who, 
emulating the American Civil Liberties Union and the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s Legal Defense 
Fund, created legal organizations devoted to social causes.161  
These self-professed public interest lawyers, in the name of the 
weak and disenfranchised, attacked governmental programs for 
failing to live up to federal law or constitutional standards.162  And 
they did so, as Professors Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod 
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explain, by way of the legal hook.163  The legal hook operated as 
follows: 
Reform-minded attorneys identify a program that needs 
change, construct a legal theory that some constitutional 
or statutory requirement has been violated, and file a 
lawsuit.  The alleged violation becomes, in the parlance of 
lawyers, a ‘legal hook’ for seeking broader reform.164 
The legal hook was successful in achieving victories in court.  Public 
interest attorneys scored a host of victories during the 1960s and 
1970s by using law to achieve social reforms.165 
The legal hook gibed with the liberal, reform-minded spirit that 
animated the Supreme Court in the 1960s.  While departing from 
the text and history of the Constitution proved wrenching to the 
Brown I Court, the Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren found it 
far easier.  Depending on one’s political or jurisprudential views, 
the Warren Court’s decisions are the most beloved or maligned 
holdings of all time.  Some notable examples include Gideon v. 
Wainwright, which established a right to counsel in state criminal 
proceedings, Miranda v. Arizona, where the Court articulated a list 
of rights police officers must recite prior to custodial interrogation, 
and Griswold v. Connecticut, where the Court discerned a 
constitutional right to “marital privacy,” which encompassed 
contraceptive communications.166  Griswold was the most 
infamous.  In flowery language, Justice William Douglas opined 
“that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, 
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them 
life and substance.”167  Griswold’s reasoning, in turn, was 
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instrumental to Roe v. Wade, the most controversial product of the 
Warren Court’s jurisprudential philosophy.168 
The activist spirit was not limited to high-profile disputes.  For 
example, in a 1973 case, the Court held that a group of five law 
students could challenge orders of a federal agency based on the 
group’s allegation that claimed that they “suffered economic, 
recreational and aesthetic harm directly as a result of the adverse 
environmental impact” of a regulatory action.169  Holdings like 
these reflected the belief of many of the Justices that the law should 
adapt with the times, unrestrained by precedent or historical 
understanding of constitutional provisions.  Chief Justice Warren 
captured this sentiment in his 1972 book, “A Republic, If You Can 
Keep It”: 
Where there is injustice, we should correct it; where there 
is poverty, we should eliminate it; where there is 
corruption, we should stamp it out; where there is violence, 
we should punish it; where there is neglect, we should 
provide care; where there is war, we should restore peace; 
and wherever corrections are achieved we should add them 
permanently to our storehouse of treasures.170 
Brown was but one attack upon racial disparity in public 
education—an arguably more significant development was the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which, like Brown, prohibited segregation in 
public schools.171  The Civil Rights Act also contained a procedural 
provision that had a significant impact on public education.172  This 
provision required the United States Commissioner of Education—
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renamed the Secretary of Education after the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare became a cabinet level post in 
1979—to study public education and determine how much “race, 
color, religion, or national origin” affected equality of education in 
public schools.173  President Lyndon Johnson eventually reached 
out to Sociologist James Coleman, who agreed to conduct the 
study.174  His findings were published in a 1966 report titled 
“Equality of Educational Opportunity.”175 
Coleman’s findings were nuanced and not susceptible to 
political categorization.  First, Coleman discerned what is now 
known as the achievement gap.176  Poor and African-American 
students scored several grades below affluent white students in 
math and reading.177  However, the cause was not, as liberal 
reformers had surmised, a simple lack of money.  Coleman found 
that the most important factor dictating a child’s success was his or 
her familial and social circumstances.178  As Coleman later 
explained, “‘[a]ll factors considered, the most important variable—
in or out of school—in a child’s performance remains his family’s 
education background.’”179 
Coleman’s other findings further explained the achievement 
gap.  Coleman found that diversity, in the fullest sense of the word, 
was crucial to student success.180  This meant a holistic sense of 
diversity beyond mere racial diversity.181  Coleman also observed 
that affluent students succeeded because they felt they had agency 
and were masters of their own fate.182  The poor, by contrast, felt 
that they were victims of life circumstances.183  Coleman also 
discounted the role of teachers, finding that learning was a 
“‘function more of the characteristics of his classmates than of those 
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of the teacher.’”184 
With specific respect to school funding, Coleman found that 
while there were “some definite and systematic directions of 
difference between the schools attended by minorities and those 
attended by the majority,” there was relatively little disparity 
between the facilities and programs afforded to African-American 
and white communities.185  Regional factors were “usually 
considerably greater than minority-majority differences.”186  
Coleman specifically found that “when student body characteristics 
[we]re taken into account, the variance accounted for by a facilities 
measure (which includes per pupil expenditure) is very small 
indeed.”187  Coleman further submitted that “if adjustments had 
been made to remove student body factors in the present analysis, 
together with facilities and curriculum measures, the unique 
contribution of per pupil expenditure for Southern Negroes would 
have nearly vanished.”188  Thus, according to the report, there was 
not a drastic need to redistribute cash to African-American and 
poor communities.189  However, even if policymakers were inclined 
to do so, Coleman felt that those efforts would be in vain.190  As he 
put it, schools “‘bring little influence to bear on a child’s 
achievement that is independent of his background and social 
context.’”191  Poor school achievement, in other words, was a mere 
symptom of an unhealthy social and familial environment.192 
The report was not what the public or the federal government 
expected.193  It did not suggest simple or identifiably partisan 
recommendations, and liberals and conservatives derived different 
lessons from it.194  Liberals focused on the economic inequality 
findings, arguing that economic redistribution would help fight 
poverty and inequality.195  Conservatives argued that more money 
would not solve schools’ woes since, according to the report, money 
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was a relatively irrelevant factor in student achievement.196 
The liberal interpretation inspired many in the academy to 
launch an offensive against school financing systems.197  Almost 
every state, including Rhode Island, divided public education costs 
at the state and local levels, relying on a formula to determine the 
extent of the state contribution.  While the state contribution was 
equal or equitable (i.e., it provided a greater percentage of money 
to poorer districts), this was usually offset by large disparities in 
local contributions, which were culled from local school taxes 
(which, in turn, were derived from the property tax base). 
This discrepancy was untenable to many reformers, including 
scholars.198  Historian James Gordon Ward has traced the origin of 
the argument that discrepancies in school funding violated the U.S. 
Constitution’s Equal Protection clause to two books.199  Educator 
Arthur Wise published the first, Rich Schools Poor Schools, in 
1968.200  In the book, Wise applied Brown I’s equal protection 
principle to school funding.201  If “separate but equal” school 
systems were unconstitutional, Wise asked, how could unequally 
funded school systems be constitutional?202  Wise offered a detailed 
journey through a wide array of Supreme Court cases concerning 
the equal protection clause.203  After concluding that the Supreme 
Court had, in many instances, intervened to protect groups which 
had been subject to irrational treatment, Wise posed the following 
inquiry: “Can children receive substantially different educational 
opportunities solely because of their parents’ economy 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. James Gordon Ward, Conflict and Consensus in the Historical Process: 
The Intellectual Foundations of the School Finance Reform Litigation 
Movement, 24 J. OF EDUC. FIN., no. 1, Summer 1998, at 14. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 14–15.  Professor Judith C. Areen notes that Arthur Wise posed 
a short version of the argument in a 1965 article in the publication 
Administrator’s Notebook.  See Judith C. Areen, The Judicial and Education 
Reform: A Reassessment, 61 GEO. L. REV. 1009, 1012, n.19 (1973).  Wise 
explained, in a published interview, that the 1965 article was based upon a 
term paper which he wrote while a student at Harvard in the spring of 1964.  
Deborah A. Verstegen, Arthur E. Wise and the Promise of Equal Educational 
Opportunity, 25 J. OF EDUC. FIN., no. 4, Spring 2000, at 583, 585. 
 200. Gordon Ward, supra note 197, at 14. 
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 202. See generally ARTHUR E. WISE, RICH SCHOOLS POOR SCHOOLS: THE 
PROMISE OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1968). 
 203. Id. 
2019] SCHOOL FUNDING 297 
circumstances or where they happen to be born?”204  Wise laid out 
two approaches the Supreme Court could take to address this issue 
of educational equality.205  The Court could, as did the Warren 
Court in cases concerning criminal and indigent rights, proceed on 
a case-by-case basis.206  Alternatively, the Court could dive in to a 
state’s finances and “deal with disparities in pupil expenditures” by 
declaring certain disparities to be unconstitutional.207  Wise opined 
that the Court would not have to seek complete equality because 
there were circumstances, such as gifted students, students with 
disabilities, and “regional price differences,” that justified disparate 
expenditures.208 
Toward the end of the book, Wise candidly admitted that the 
“political impasse” of educational financing was “the basic reason 
for considering the problem a constitutional one.”209  Put bluntly, 
state legislators had no incentive to spend money that did not 
provide “direct benefits” to their constituents.210  In other words, as 
in Brown, the political route was a dead-end, and the only hope for 
reform would be through the judiciary.  This reflected the prevalent 
view in the 1960s that the Supreme Court could and should be used 
as a tool to effectuate social policy.211 
The second seminal book in shaping school funding litigation 
was John E. Coons, William H. Clune III, and Stephen D. 
Sugarman’s Private Wealth and Public Education, published in 
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concluded that the time was not right for a constitutional assault of school 
finance systems.  Id. at 150–51. 
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1970.212  The three authors, attorneys, compiled a dense tome, 
which examined issues affecting school finance and also outlined 
their case against public school funding.213  While the authors 
agreed that unequal funding of schools was wrong, they recognized 
that the problem eschewed a simplistic solution.214  Indeed, the 
authors recognized that local control was an essential component of 
school district governance, including the ability to make local 
decisions on how to allocate limited governmental resources.215  
Thus, radical yet simplistic proposals—such as abolition of the 
public schools, or state control with an attendant per-pupil rate or 
needs-based system—would not do.216  The authors offered a 
moderate proposal to combat the problem: a formula that rewarded 
districts for the percentage of wealth they taxed instead of the 
amount of tax revenue which they collected.217  The problem, the 
authors posited, was that the same percentage of taxation yielded 
less money in school districts with a smaller tax base.218  Thus, if 
district A has ten times the tax base of district B, a ten percent tax 
might yield ten million dollars in district A but only one million 
dollars in district B.219  The authors proposed that the richest 
district would set the tax ceiling, and the state would kick in the 
amount to help poorer districts meet this ceiling.220  So using the 
hypothetical above, a state would pay nine million dollars to district 
B so that each district taxed ten percent of its tax base and received 
ten million dollars in revenue.  The authors deemed this procedure 
“power equalization.”221 
The authors, unlike more utopian reformers, were not after a 
fixed measure of equality or a uniform per-pupil rate.222  They 
conceded that their proposal would permit voters to let their schools 
descend into financial oblivion if that was what they chose.223  The 
authors’ grievance was that school districts were not allowed a free 
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or fair choice with respect to funding, as the deck was stacked in 
favor of districts with more taxable wealth.224  Thus, the authors’ 
argument can be described as “free market plus”: it heartily 
endorsed a libertarian approach to school district funding so long 
as the playing field was leveled. 
Interestingly, Private Wealth and Public Education opened 
with a foreword by none other than James Coleman, author of 
Equality of Educational Opportunity.225  Coleman’s foreword was 
laudatory but guarded.226  Coleman credited the scope of the 
authors’ inquiry and their novel theory of power equalization; he 
deemed it “an impressive intellectual feat.”227  Coleman also voiced 
his agreement with those portions of the book advocating for family 
choice, reiterating his findings that a child’s familial and social 
circumstances were of paramount importance.228  Thus, “any state 
which dictates the school or school district to which each child goes 
is unequally distributing . . . educational resources, however 
equally it is distributing finances.”229 
Coleman concluded his foreword by asking the big question 
that loomed behind Private Wealth and Public Education: “How far 
should states go in seeking equality?”230  The answer, Coleman 
stated, was elusive.231  Tinkering with funding mechanisms was 
relatively uncontroversial.232  But there had also been, as Coleman 
delicately observed, state efforts toward “racial and class 
integration,” which proved “even more ineffective than . . . 
attempt[s] to redistribute financial resources.”233  Thus, the role of 
the states was “not a question that is easily answered, and it is not 
a question raised in this book.”234  Those difficult questions would 
soon be raised in a series of court cases alleging that local funding 
mechanisms violated the United States Constitution. 
VI. SCHOOL FUNDING LITIGATION: FROM THE ACADEMY TO THE 
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COURTROOM 
Wise and the trio of Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, represented 
a “wave of consciously activist scholarship written with an avowed 
bias, and aimed at producing specific legal results.”235  
Unsurprisingly, activists transported these arguments into 
court.236  While the precise legal theory varied, the basic premise, 
was that states were not evenly or fairly distributing resources 
among districts.237  The first landmark victory for advocates was 
Serrano v. Priest, a 1971 decision by the California Supreme Court, 
which held that California’s school funding system violated the 
equal protection clause.238  California, like most states, funded 
schools through a combination of local property taxes and state 
funds.239  The California Supreme Court reasoned, using language 
reminiscent of Coons et al., that the system was unconstitutional 
because it “makes the quality of a child’s education depend upon 
the resources of his school district and ultimately upon the 
pocketbook of his parents.”240  While the court agreed with the 
plaintiffs on the equal protection argument, it expressly disclaimed 
reliance on the education guarantee in the California Constitution, 
ruling that the state constitutional guarantee of a “system” of public 
education merely referred to “uniform[ity] in terms of the 
prescribed course of study and educational progression from grade 
to grade,” not equal funding.241  Due to the procedural posture of 
the case, the court did not have to address the thorny issue of 
remedy; the case was instead remanded for trial.242 
 
 235. Stephen R. Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A 
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Serrano’s radical holding delighted advocates and stunned 
more circumspect commentators.243  Professor Judith C. Areen 
found it “remarkable” that a court would “simply assume [] that 
quantity of funding relates directly to quality of schooling,” relying 
upon “a simple factory model” where “money was the input and 
educated students the output.”244  Serrano also inspired similar 
lawsuits throughout the country, including a federal lawsuit filed 
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas 
captioned Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District.245  
The court’s decision could have been written by Coons and his co-
authors; for example, in a knowingly or unknowingly plagiarized 
passage, the court wrote that “the quality of public education may 
not be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a 
whole.246  The defendants, state entities, appealed the decision and 
 
Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis.  411 U.S. 1 (1973).  Additionally, 
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the California Supreme Court criticized in its 1971 opinion.  Serrano, 487 P.2d 
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the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.247 
As explained in Rodriguez, Texas, like California, Rhode 
Island, and virtually all states, operated a dual system of school 
financing comprised of local property taxes and state funding.248  In 
the mid-twentieth-century, Texas—again, like Rhode Island—
established a foundation aid program designed to distribute state 
aid to those districts that needed it most.249  However, inequalities 
among districts persisted, largely due to differing property tax 
bases.250  The Rodriguez lawsuit was brought as a class action 
lawsuit by Mexican-American students and other minority 
students “who [were] poor and reside[d] in school districts having a 
low property tax base . . . .”251 
Finding that wealth was a ‘suspect’ classification and that 
education was a ‘fundamental’ interest, the district court held that 
the Texas system could be sustained only if the State could show 
that it was premised upon some compelling state interest.252  On 
that issue, the court concluded, “[n]ot only are defendants unable to 
demonstrate a compelling state interest . . . they fail even to 
establish a reasonable basis for these classifications.”253 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, in a rebuke to the 
district court and Serrano.254  The Court first addressed the 
plaintiffs’ imprecise definition of its “suspect class.”255  The Court 
found the district court’s analysis on this point to be lackadaisical, 
surmising that the class could be defined one of three ways: (1) 
“poor” people as defined by a certain level of income; (2) relatively 
poor individuals; or (3) those who live in “poor” school districts.256  
The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to produce sufficient 
evidence on the first two categories.257  It further noted that, proof 
aside, the assumption underlying these class definitions (i.e., that 
the poorest people lived in locations with the worst public schools) 
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was not self-evident.258  With respect to the third definition, the 
Court noted that this could be defined to include children in every 
district other than the richest district (the definition adopted by the 
California Supreme Court in Serrano), or children in districts with 
assessable property that falls below some fixed measure.259  The 
Court did not accept either of these definitions, deeming the 
plaintiffs “a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the 
common factor of residence in districts that happen to have less 
taxable wealth than other districts.”260 
Next, the Court held that education was not a fundamental 
right under the United States Constitution.261  Education was not 
found in the text of the Constitution, the Court reasoned, and the 
mere importance of a right did not make it fundamental.262  In a 
bit of circular reasoning, the Court stated that a right could only be 
considered fundamental if it were an “established constitutional 
right.”263  Linguistic formulations aside, the “established 
constitutional right” standard presented a high bar.  For example, 
as the Rodriguez Court noted, a 1970 decision held that the right to 
public welfare benefits was not fundamental.264  Moreover, the 
plaintiffs in Rodriguez were not alleging a total deprivation of 
education, they merely complained about relative funding levels 
and the relative quality of education.265  Thus, the Court found that 
the plaintiffs failed meet their burden of proving a fundamental 
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right.266 
Because the case did not involve infringement of a fundamental 
right, it received the same scrutiny as ordinary legislation: rational 
basis review.  Under this standard, Texas passed with flying 
colors.267  As a preliminary matter, the Court recognized that the 
case “involve[d] . . . persistent and difficult questions of educational 
policy” outside of the Court’s bailiwick.268  Borrowing a memorable 
phrase from Dandridge v. Williams, the welfare benefits case, the 
Court stated: “Education, perhaps even more than welfare 
assistance, presents a myriad of ‘intractable economic, social, and 
even philosophical problems.’”269  The Court further observed that 
Texas had taken numerous steps to decrease inequality and 
promote education throughout the state.270 
The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ argument that disparate 
funding harmed poor individuals.  Taxation always has some 
discriminatory impact, the Court noted, and states needed some 
leeway to design and carry out such systems.271  Additionally, the 
Court explained, even if it declared Texas’ system unconstitutional, 
the plaintiffs did not propose an alternative system to replace it.272  
Presumably, the Court noted in a footnote, the replacement would 
be one hundred percent state funding.273  The Court also identified 
the “power equalization” theory of Coons et al. as another 
alternative, but dismissed it as unworkable, noting that 
commentators disagreed as to “whether it is feasible, how it would 
work, and indeed whether [the theory itself] would violate the equal 
protection [clause] . . . .”274 
Thus, the door to a federal right to education had been 
decisively closed, but advocates were not deterred.  They promptly 
shifted their focus to the states, grounding their arguments in state 
equal protection clauses.275  Indeed, in a major victory for 
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advocates, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held in 
1973 (the same year Rodriguez was decided) that its school funding 
system violated the State’s education clause.276  Over the next 
several decades, dozens of lawsuits were filed alleging that 
educational funding violated state constitutions.277  Eventually, as 
Michael A. Rebell explained, “[a]t the end of the 1980s, civil rights 
lawyers changed their focus from equal protection claims based on 
disparities in . . . funding . . . to claims based on opportunities for a 
basic level of education guaranteed by the specific provisions in the 
state constitutions.”278  Thus, arguments about “equality” gave way 
to arguments about “adequacy.”279  The underlying issue, however, 
remained the same: litigants sought to use the courts to effectuate 
social change concerning public education.280 
Within the context of school funding litigation, New Jersey is 
also famous for the monumental struggle of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court to bend the legislature to its will.  As noted above, 
in a landmark 1973 decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court found 
the state’s funding mechanism unconstitutional.281  And in a later 
decision, Abbott v. Burke, the court found that the educational 
system was inadequate as applied to poor urban districts.282  After 
Abbott, the matters returned to the political branches, where foot-
dragging and noncompliance followed.  Commentator Alexandra 
Greif has described an example of the legislature’s failings: the 
fallout after the passage of the State Quality Education Act of 1990 
(QEA).283  The QEA would have redistributed money into the poor 
urban districts at issue in pending school funding litigation.284  
However, it faced fierce resistance from suburban voters and the 
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state’s largest teachers’ union.285  Greif explains that the law 
shifted pension contributions from the state to local districts, and 
that teachers would get lower benefits or wages if the local districts 
could not meet their pension responsibilities.286  Against this 
political backlash, “legislators buckled.”287  They replaced the QEA 
with a watered-down successor, and Democrats, who held 
majorities in the legislature and had championed the QEA, paid 
with their seats.  Even though the QEA had never taken effect and 
Democrats acceded to public outcry, many voters still smoldered 
over Democrats support for the QEA in the first instance.  As a 
result, in 1991, Republicans gained majorities in both houses.288  
The case presented a cautionary tale in school funding litigation; 
not only was legislative compliance with court orders a heavy 
political lift, but doing so could also cost legislators their jobs. 
Given the ubiquity of state education and equal protection 
clauses, it was only a matter of time until a school funding lawsuit 
reached Rhode Island.  Economic circumstances provided a 
convenient moment: “severe economic distress” caused by the 
Governor’s closing of forty-five insolvent credit unions in 1991 
resulted in caps to state education reimbursement.  The overall 
reimbursement rate dropped from 52.3 percent in 1991 to 38.1 
percent in 1992.289 
VII. CHALLENGES TO RHODE ISLAND’S PUBLIC EDUCATION FUNDING 
SYSTEM 
The first challenge to Rhode Island’s funding system was City 
of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, a consolidated challenge brought by 
students, parents, government officials, and multiple schools.290  
On February 24, 1994, the superior court ruled that Rhode Island’s 
funding system violated the state equal protection and education 
clauses of the Rhode Island Constitution.291  Following this 
blockbuster holding, a host of school districts and politicians 
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scrambled to intervene on appeal.292 
In its decision, the Rhode Island Supreme Court first explained 
that the General Assembly was entitled to enormous 
deference.293  Rhode Island vested unlimited power in the 
legislature, subject only to constitutional carve-outs for the 
executive and judiciary branches.294  Thus, to prevail, the litigants 
were required to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the 
legislature violated the constitution.295 
The court next examined the history of the education 
clause.296  The court noted that, although there were consistent 
calls to establish a system of free schools in Rhode Island in after 
the revolution, localism generally prevailed.297  An 1828 Act 
permitted towns to raise revenue to support schools and established 
a state fund to support education.298  But efforts such as this 
contemplated minimal state involvement in public education.299 
This approach persisted after the Dorr Rebellion.  The court 
noted, as explained above, that the legislature deliberately snubbed 
Dorr’s People’s Constitution with respect to education by adopting, 
almost verbatim, the language utilized in the Landholders’ 
Constitution.300  Additionally, Barnard’s suggestions, enacted by 
the legislature, squeezed local districts for funds, not the 
State.301  Indeed, the Barnard Act’s requirement that localities 
impose a certain level of local taxation as a prerequisite to obtaining 
state funds demonstrated that localities bore the primary 
responsibility for education.302 
The plaintiffs’ expert conceded that neither the 1842 
Constitution nor the Barnard Act required towns to even establish 
schools, let alone ensure an equal or minimum level of funding.303  
Indeed, the court observed that the legislature did not explicitly 
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require that towns operate schools until 1882.304  The expert 
further conceded that equal funding was a “‘relatively new concept’” 
unknown to nineteenth-century legislators.305 
The court also determined that the Rhode Island 
Constitutional Convention of 1986 did not add anything to its 
analysis.306  By 1986, Rodriguez was thirteen years old and school 
funding lawsuits had been litigated in at least seventeen state 
courts.307  Thus, if the 1986 convention sought to provide a 
minimum funding level or impose some sort of equality principle, it 
would have explicitly done so, and it did not.  Indeed, among the 
resolutions that it explicitly rejected were guarantees of “‘an equal 
opportunity for an education on a per capita basis,’” and “‘an equal 
education regardless of [a child’s] community of residence.’”308 
The court then considered the parties’ equal protection claim.  
In an analysis echoing Rodriguez, the court explained that the 
General Assembly had, since the mid-twentieth century, increased 
state funding for public education and attempted to make it more 
equitable.309  At the turn of the century, the State offered funding 
to school districts that enacted desired reforms,310 such as creating 
high schools or hiring qualified superintendents.311  In 1955, Rhode 
Island enacted its foundation aid program, which provided a per 
pupil rate of seventeen dollars and a $200,000 equalization fund to 
be distributed based on need.312  In 1960, that program was 
supplanted by an operation aid program, which ensured that the 
State shouldered a greater percentage of the cost of education in 
poorer districts.313  Rhode Island further enacted a host of reforms 
in the early 1990s that further increased the amount of aid to poorer 
districts.314  The court stated that the wealthy districts currently 
receive little, if any, State reimbursement.315  And in 1993, the 
legislature created a “distressed district fund,” which provided 
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money—for public school purposes only—to three poor districts.316  
In sum, as local and State school spending consistently increased, 
the State had taken measures to redistribute funding where it was 
needed.317 
In reaching a contrary holding, the superior court had reasoned 
that Rhode Island’s education clause was textually similar to 
clauses in Massachusetts and Kentucky, whose courts found their 
state funding schemes unconstitutional.318  The superior court also 
reasoned that the word “promote” in the education clause imposed 
an obligation on the State to ensure that school districts were 
roughly equal because “in many instances” in the nineteenth 
century, the word was used interchangeably with “found” or 
“establish.”319 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected these arguments.320  
First, any suggestion that the history of the education clause 
supported an official measure of adequacy or equality was “clearly 
wrong.”321 Rhode Island towns were not required to have schools in 
1842.322  If there was no mandate for a school, there was certainly 
no mandate for equity.323  Second, “promote” did not obligate the 
State to offer some base level of service.324  Quoting the definition 
of “promote” in Noah Webster’s 1828 dictionary, the court found 
that the word, then and now, meant “[t]o forward” or “to 
advance.”325  And, as evidenced by the education clause, “promote” 
could not mean found or establish for two reasons: first, towns were 
not required to establish schools; and, second, towns established the 
schools, not the general assembly.326  Finally, the court observed 
that the general assembly’s mission—to “promote education by all 
means which it may deem necessary and proper”—reflected a desire 
to vest educational issues in the general assembly and to afford it 
discretion in choosing how to accomplish such goals.327 
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The court next addressed the separation of powers doctrine, 
which applied to both the education clause and equal protection 
claims.328  The judiciary, the court reasoned, was an inappropriate 
forum for school funding challenges.329  Even if the court deemed 
the funding scheme unconstitutional, there were no “judicially 
manageable standards” to manage the legislature’s efforts.330  The 
court cited the bitter back-and-forth that occurred between the 
state legislature and the judiciary in New Jersey in the wake of 
Abbott.  The court also cited the United States Supreme Court’s 
1995 decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, which released Missouri from 
an eighteen-year-old desegregation order.331  The thrust of that 
decision was that the district in question had made progress toward 
integration and that control over the school system should be 
returned to the local district as soon as possible.332  Heeding 
Jenkins, the Sundlun court held that the General Assembly had 
virtually unlimited discretion, and that the plaintiffs “should seek 
their remedy in that forum rather than in the courts.”333 
Nevertheless, the court briefly touched upon the merits of the 
equal protection claim.334  The court reasoned that the level of 
scrutiny was low because no fundamental right was involved.  
Thus, the court easily found that preservation of local control was 
a legitimate state interest and that reliance on a partial degree of 
local financing for school district rationally furthered this 
interest.335  The court further chided the superior court for 
excluding evidence of Rhode Island’s relative equality in education 
funding.336  This revealed that, in 1989–1990, Rhode Island was 
the third most equalized per-pupil ratio state in the country.337  The 
court acknowledged that Rhode Island, and most of New England, 
offered a low amount of total state reimbursement.338  But more 
significantly for an equal protection analysis, the amount offered 
was equitably distributed. 
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Finally, the court noted that it was loath to endorse a definition 
of equality that was outcome-based.  Citing again to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Missouri v. Jenkins, it noted that the school 
district in that case received significant financial upgrades after the 
desegregation decree, yet continued to struggle with 
achievement.339  This “illustrate[d] that money alone may never be 
sufficient to bring about ‘learner outcomes’ in all students.”340 
Decisive as Sundlun was, two school committees, Woonsocket 
and Pawtucket, posed a second challenge in 2010.341  According to 
the complaint, two things had changed since Sundlun, which 
compelled an opposite result.  First, Rhode Island voters adopted 
constitutional amendments in 2004, which affirmed the principle of 
separation of powers and eliminated the “Continuing Powers” 
clause discussed in Sundlun.342  This clause stated that the general 
assembly continued to possess the powers it wielded prior to the 
1842 Constitution.343  Second, the general assembly had tweaked 
the school funding formula and, according to the plaintiffs, 
produced new disparities.344  The school committees again asserted 
violations of the state equal protection clause and added an 
allegation that the funding scheme violated students’ substantive 
due process rights.345 
The superior court rejected the claims out of hand, reasoning 
that Sundlun and an advisory opinion issued by the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court in 2008 precluded such challenges under the 
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doctrine of stare decisis.346  On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court agreed, finding that the issues had been squarely raised and 
addressed in Sundlun.347  The court acknowledged that Sundlun 
had cited and relied upon the “Continuing Powers” clause, but the 
court found that its reasoning was not dependent upon the 
clause.348  The Sundlun court’s broader point was that, in Rhode 
Island’s constitutional system of government, the general assembly 
wielded plenary power over education.349  The court made short 
work of the substantive due process argument, upholding the trial 
court’s finding that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of 
proving that the funding scheme bore “‘no substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.’”350  In sum, 
while concerned by the allegations of inadequacy, and leaving the 
door open for a constitutional violation on more egregious facts, the 
plaintiffs had shown no reason to depart from the court’s ruling in 
Sundlun.351 
As noted above, litigants have commenced a new federal 
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island 
which, though not a typical school funding lawsuit, is a direct 
descendant of the school funding litigation.352  Indeed, like many of 
the school funding lawsuits, although the lawsuit is directed at the 
State of Rhode Island, it has little to do with the Ocean State.353  
As noted in a recent profile of the case published in The Atlantic, 
“[one] thing that made Rhode Island appealing was not that it stood 
out for any reason, but that it didn’t . . . .”354  Thus, Rhode Island 
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simply proved a convenient forum for a new spin on a well-worn 
legal theory.355 
While A.C. v. Raimondo may yet be resolved through a close 
analysis of the history of the federal or Rhode Island constitutions, 
early signs are not encouraging.  For example, in paragraph thirty-
four of the complaint, the plaintiffs assert that “[i]n the nineteenth 
century, a ‘common school’ system—i.e., the American public school 
system—was established precisely to ensure that all students, rich 
or poor, native or immigrant, may be educated together in a 
common environment in which civic knowledge and civic values 
could be inculcated.”356  Even allowing for some advocacy, the claim 
is patently untrue.  The plaintiffs’ claim is reminiscent of an 1870 
Thomas Nast cartoon depicting a “happy circle of racially diverse 
children” as emblematic of the common schools.357  As Benjamin 
Justice indicates, “Revisionist scholars and their successors have 
ungently dissected the naiveté of this vision, pointing to segregated 
schools for African and Native Americans, no school for Chinese 
children in California, and so on.”358 
CONCLUSION 
The school funding cases raise fundamental questions about 
government and democracy.  What role should states have in 
determining school funding?  Should state legislatures or courts 
make these decisions?  Can the democratic process be trusted to 
resolve social inequality, or should the judiciary nudge the political 
branches toward social progress?  The answers to these questions 
inevitably involve questions of constitutional interpretation, as 
each state constitution mandates a system of public education.359  
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Constitutional meaning, of course, may simply be whatever a court 
wants it to be.  But this approach lacks principle; it turns 
constitutional debates into mere political battles. 
The better approach, I argue, is constitutional interpretation 
based on the historical circumstances that motivated a 
constitutional provision.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court used 
this approach in City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, basing its decision 
on the historical circumstances that motivated the education clause 
of the Rhode Island Constitution, not a theory developed by 
academics in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.  The 
historical approach is “conservative” in the sense that it seeks to 
constrain the potential universe of constitutional interpretation.  
But this should not be conflated with political conservatism.  As the 
authors of a 1972 article published in the Yale Law Journal posited, 
courts’ poor institutional capacity for making policy could, in the 
realm of education finance, “leave the legislatures latitude to revise 
educational finance in ways which would not help—and in fact 
could hurt—the poor.”360  The call of the times can be deafening.  
But it is fidelity to democratic principles, such as sound 
constitutional interpretation, that will ultimately prove enduring. 
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